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Questions and Answers
Bjorn Satdeva It has finally happened. On March 5, 1996, CERT published the first CERT Advisory regarding a security flaw in the Netscape Navigator 2.0 Java implementation and in Release 1.0 of the Java Developer's Kit from Sun Microsystems, Inc. I don't think that this came as a surprise to anybody in the security community, as concerns and unofficial bug reports about Java have been circulating for several months. In fact, it may be just the first of many security flaws in the Java design and implementation. If you have been following the security discussions in the Java NetNews newsgroup, you will know that most of discussion has not been about the various security flaws in Java, but rather how the little security that has been included does not allow various types of implementation. The few people who do point out the security weaknesses and problems often get flamed for their effort. What makes all this very, very scary, is that most people are completely unaware of the many security risks that already exist on the World Wide Web. In my opinion, the efforts that are in progress are hopelessly inadequate from an overall security perspective. Implementation of SSL or S-HTML will only be able to address part of the problem. Unfortunately, the only way this mess will ever be cleaned up, is if the current generation of Web browsers and servers, together with HTML, is thrown out and a replacement is created that will allow the Web to operate securely. This will of course will not happen until after Hell has frozen over. We can therefore expect an outbreak of security incidents related to the World Wide Web. From a system administrator or security personnel standpoint, unfortunately, there is not much that can be done. Unlike with other threats coming from the Internet, there is currently no firewall technology available that can protect a site from these problems, and it is not likely that we will soon see any solutions to effectively address these issues. This issue cannot be addressed at the protocol level, because the threat is not apparently at that level. If you want to implement a protection against bad applets, it will be necessary to implement a check of malicious code within the applet, something which certainly is a very nontrivial task. And you will need to do so with every other kind of file downloaded by a World Wide Web client. Another example along the same line is the downloading and display of Postscript. Postscript is really implemented in the language Forth and the Postscript interpreter will execute Forth commands. It is therefore possible to create a Postscript file with the side effect that when the Postscript viewer displays the file, it will also remove files from the hard disk. I believe that most modern Postscript viewers on UNIX (like the GNU program gs) will now reject such a request, but it is not necessarily so for older implementations and some PC-based Postscript viewers. It is not just Java that has proven to be a security problem. Abug in Netscape Navigator 2.0 allows a browser to send email to a third party without the person accessing the web page having any idea of what is taking place. This is going a step further than the old mail spoofing issue, where somebody telnets to port 25 on a remote machine, and starts typing at the sendmail daemon. In this case, the mail actually originates on the machine it claims to come from. Taken to an extreme, somebody could create a web page, and when you accessed the web page, you would unknowingly send email to whitehouse.gov, saying "The President is a Fool. Shoot Him," then the Secret Service would beat down your door, arrest you, and sieze your machine. And lo and behold, the machine's log would prove that you did indeed send the offending email. Although the above scenario is a bit extreme, in my opinion, if you are using Netscape 2.0, you better upgrade as soon as possible. Tool of the Month This month's tool is Argus, a public domain package that provides a generic IP network transaction auditing tool. Argus runs as an application level daemon, promiscuously reading network datagrams from a specified interface, and generates network traffic status records for the network activity that it encounters. Argus has been built and tested under SunOS 4.x, Solaris 2.3, and SGI IRIX5.2. Argus enables a site to generate comprehensive network transaction audit logs in a fashion that provides for high degrees of data reduction semantic preservation. This allows the system administrator to perform extensive historical analysis of network traffic. The package includes two example programs for analyzing the network transaction audit logs. Argus is available from:
ftp::ftp/sysadmin.com/pub/admin/tools/hosts/argus
http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/notes/ Notes09.shtml
ftp://ftp.cis.upenn.edu/pub/xv
If you like the software, there is a shareware license fee of $25 per copy. The source file has the necessary information on how to register your copy.
What you might have been thinking of the swiPe project, which is used to create encrypted IP tunnels through packet encapsulation.
You might find parts of the firewall mailing list archives of use, as there has for some time been an intense UNIX versus NT flame war going on. You can find a copy of the archives at:
ftp://ftp.sysadmin.com/pub/admin/ \ firewalls/archives/firewall
It looks to me that the UNIX geeks think NT is not yet ready for prime time, while the NT supporters seem to say that it doesn't matter as long as they can run something that is not UNIX. But then, I am a confessed UNIX geek and may be biased in this discussion.
About the Author
Bjorn Satdeva is the president of /sys/admin, inc., a consulting firm which specializes in large installation system administration. Bjorn is also co-founder and former president of Bay-LISA, a San Francisco Bay Area user's group for system administrators of large sites. Bjorn can be contacted at /sys/admin, inc., 2787 Moorpark Ave., San Jose, CA 95128; electronically at bjorn@sysadmin.com; or by phone at (408) 241-3111.
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